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It has been almost a quarter of a century since the Supreme Court of Canada’s deci­
sion in O ’Malley incorporated the concept of the duty to accommodate into Canadian 
human rights law and almost a decade since that concept acquired a more prominent 
position in that Court’s adoption of the unified test for bona fide occupational require­
ment (BFOR) in Meiorin.1 Yet, I think there remains some conceptual confusion 
about exactly where and how the concept fits in current Canadian human rights law.
The duty to accommodate cannot be properly understood as a stand-alone 
concept. It should be seen as subsumed within the overarching concept of reasonable 
necessity as a critical part of the test for a BFOR. It is also inextricably bound up with 
the qualification of undue hardship. Moreover, a full appreciation of accommoda­
tion includes both individual and systemic dimensions. The duty to accommodate 
originated as an ad hoc notion, involving only after-the-fact tinkering. A full develop­
ment of the concept of accommodation requires an appreciation of systemic aspects 
that have the potential for fundamental transformation of the world of work. To date, 
the systemic aspects of accommodation have been given only scant attention. In my 
assessment, as explored in this article, the lack of clarity on all of these points stems 
largely from the duty to accommodate concept not having fully escaped its roots.
THE ROOTS IN O’MALLEY
The duty to accommodate was incorporated into Canadian human rights law simul­
taneously with the recognition of adverse effects discrimination. The initial asso­
ciation of the duty to accommodate with adverse effects discrimination viewed 
accommodation as individualized and ad hoc exceptions to general rules, where 
the general rules were not being questioned. That was the context of O ’Malley.
O ’Malley involved a claim against retail chain Simpsons-Sears alleging dis­
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crimination on the basis of creed. O’Malley was required by Simpsons-Sears to re­
vert to part-time from full-time employment as a sales clerk when her conversion to 
Seventh Day Adventism caused a conflict between her religious convictions and her 
full-time work schedule. Simpsons-Sears required all full-time sales clerks to work 
some Saturdays, but the tenets of Seventh Day Adventism preclude work on Saturday, 
its Sabbath. Simpsons-Sears continued to employ O’Malley in a part-time capacity 
without Saturday shifts, but refused to fashion a full-time schedule not involving Sat­
urday work.
There were several elements of O ’Malley that made it relatively easy for 
it to serve as a test case for the recognition of adverse effects discrimination and 
the concomitant duty to accommodate up to the point of undue hardship. It is clear 
that Simpsons-Sears acted as it did on the assumption that its only legal obliga­
tion was to avoid direct (intentional) discrimination, and that it had no duty to ac­
commodate O’Malley’s religious convictions. When the Supreme Court of Canada 
concluded that Simpsons-Sears was wrong in law, Simpsons-Sears bore the brunt 
of its mistake of law, but its liability in this respect was quite limited. Although 
it is certainly ironic given the recognition of the case as having significantly ex­
panded anti-discrimination law, O’Malley was not a champion of sex equality.
Before the Board of Inquiry the complainant said she was no longer interest­
ed in full-time employment because her husband preferred that she not work 
full time. She, therefore, now seeks compensation only for the difference 
in remuneration between full-time and part-time employment lost between 
October 23, 1978 and July 6, 1979, the date of her marriage.2
Accordingly, there was little pressure on the Supreme Court of Canada to let Simp­
sons-Sears off the hook.
The O ’Malley case was also easy as a test case because the rule itself, requir­
ing full-time sales clerks to work on Saturdays, was uncontentious, given the propen­
sity of shoppers to shop on Saturdays.3 The religious basis for O’Malley’s claimed 
exception via accommodation did not undermine the logic of the rule catering to the 
vast majority of shoppers having no religious constraints on Saturday shopping. The 
innocuous nature of the general rule in O ’Malley prompted Justice McIntyre to say:
Where there is adverse effect discrimination ... there is no question of justi­
fication raised because the rule, if  rationally connected to the employment, 
needs no justification; what is required is some measure of accommoda­
tion.4
2 O ’Malley, supra note 1 at para. 5.
3 Ibid. at para. 24.
4 Ibid. at para. 23.
As initially conceived by the Supreme Court of Canada, the duty to accom­
modate was disconnected from justification of general rules. It was seen as individu­
alized and ad hoc exceptions to generally valid rules. It was seen as minor tinkering 
rather than fundamental transformation.
From the start in O ’Malley, the duty to accommodate was quali­
fied by the limit of undue hardship.5 While embracing adverse effects (unin­
tentional) discrimination, the Court was looking for a way to contain its scope. Yet 
the Supreme Court of Canada was able to say very little about undue hardship in 
O ’Malley. Simpsons-Sears could not claim it had accommodated O’Malley up 
to the point of undue hardship where (based on the assumption of no legal obliga­
tion) it had made absolutely no efforts at accommodation in a full-time position.
Thus, the particular way in which the duty to accommodate emerged in 
O ’Malley left it somewhat disconnected from associated concepts. In the years fol­
lowing O ’Mailey, jurisprudence from the Supreme Court of Canada increasingly sepa­
rated the analysis of direct and adverse effects discrimination, with the duty to accom­
modate only linked to the latter.6 Moreover, the lack of any justification requirement 
for general rules in adverse effects discrimination cases was strengthened with the result 
that, after a finding of a prima facie case of discrimination, the analysis went straight to 
the duty to accommodate.7
THE UNIFIED TEST IN MEIORIN
Almost fourteen years after O ’Malley, the Supreme Court of Canada in Meiorin re­
treated from the bifurcated approach between direct and adverse effects discrimina­
tion. Meiorin involved a challenge to an aerobic fitness standard for forest firefighters. 
The aerobic fitness standard was introduced after Meiorin had been on the job for 
three seasons. Although her previous job performance had been judged satisfactory, 
she was terminated after failing the aerobic fitness test multiple times. Her union filed 
an unjust dismissal grievance which went to arbitration. The basis for the challenge 
to Meiorin’s dismissal was sex discrimination. Because of physiological differences 
between men and women, the aerobic fitness test was disproportionately failed by 
women. Although the test did not explicitly distinguish between men and women, 
and was thus not direct discrimination, the fact that women were significantly more 
likely to fail the test made out the prima facie case of adverse effects discrimination.8 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s prior jurisprudence adopting a bifurcated approach told 
the arbitrator that, as a case of adverse effects discrimination, the employer’s defence 
hinged on the duty to accommodate without a serious questioning of the general rule.
5 Ibid.
6 Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489, 72 D.L.R.
(4th) 417.
7 Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970,95 D.L.R. (4th) 577 
[Renaud\.
8 Meiorin, supra note 1 at para. 69.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Meiorin expressly overruled its pre­
vious jurisprudence and abandoned the bifurcated approach whereby the BFOR 
analysis had been relevant only to direct discrimination and the duty to accom­
modate had been relevant only to adverse effects discrimination. In a unani­
mous judgment in Meiorin the Court adopted a unified approach to both direct 
and adverse effects discrimination, applying a single three-step test for a BFOR.
... three-step test for determining whether a prima facie discrimina­
tory standard is a BFOR. An employer may justify the impugned 
standard by establishing on the balance of probabilities:
(1) that the employer adopted the standard for a purpose ra­
tionally connected to the performance of the job;
(2) that the employer adopted the particular standard in an hon­
est and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfil­
ment of that legitimate work-related purpose; and
(3) that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of 
that legitimate work-related purpose. To show that the standard is rea­
sonably necessary, it must be demonstrated that it is impossible to ac­
commodate individual employees sharing the characteristics of the claim­
ant without imposing undue hardship upon the employer.9
Typically steps one and two are speed bumps, ultimately conceded to the re­
spondent. The make or break part of the unified BFOR test is usually step three, where 
the duty to accommodate is incorporated.
REASONABLY NECESSARY
The significance of the unified BFOR test is not just that the duty to accommodate ap­
plies to both direct and adverse effects discrimination. What needs to be emphasized 
is that the duty to accommodate is now integrated into the justification analysis that 
the BFOR demands.10 That is a marked departure from the approach in O ’Malley set 
out above.
Though I think it is misleading, the third step of the Meiorin test is frequently 
described as the duty to accommodate step.11 The duty to accommodate is only one 
element of the third step. To focus only on the duty to accommodate risks missing the 
connection between justification and the duty to accommodate. The core of the justifica­
9 Ibid. at para. 54.
10 Ibid. at para. 62
11 e.g. Michael Lynk, “Disability and Work: The Transformation of the Legal Status of Employees with 
Disabilities in Canada” in R. Echlin & C. Paliare, eds., Law Society o f Upper Canada Special Lectures 
2007: Employment Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) 210.
tion requirement in the crucial third step of Meiorin is the concept of reasonable neces­
sity.12 Proper assessments of the duty to accommodate must be linked back to this notion. 
Failure to do so represents a slipping back into the supposedly abandoned approach of 
O ’Malley.
The integration of the duty to accommodate into the justification analysis 
means that the starting point for any BFOR analysis should be the general validity of the 
rule or policy in question. The previous failure to do that in adverse effects discrimina­
tion cases was identified in Meiorin as problematic, specifically because of its potential 
to legitimize systemic discrimination.13 Challenging systemic discrimination means 
challenging dominant norms, which involves more than simply creating exceptions to 
rules via accommodation.
Although the grammatical construction of step three of the Meio­
rin test may suggest that the duty to accommodate is always an issue, that con­
clusion does not follow from the Meiorin judgment as a whole. As previously 
noted, a principal reason for adopting a unified test in Meiorin is to ensure that 
the validity of the standard is always open to challenge. If the challenged rule 
or policy is not in any sense reasonably necessary, the BFOR test has not been 
met. In an obvious case that conclusion can be reached without consideration 
of the duty to accommodate. I have previously used the following illustration:
Take as an example an employment rule that says the job must be performed 
while standing. The rule is challenged by someone using a wheelchair. As­
sume there is actually nothing about the workplace or the job that hinges on 
whether the job is performed from a standing or seated position. In other 
words, there is no sense at all in which the standing rule is reasonably neces­
sary. In such a scenario, the rule should simply be struck, without any need 
to canvass the duty to accommodate. That would leave all employees with 
the choice of performing the job standing or seated, irrespective of whether 
they have a disability which precludes (or makes difficult) standing. Since a 
primary purpose of prohibiting disability discrimination is to challenge able- 
boded norms, the first line of inquiry should be whether the norm can be dis­
regarded altogether, without any need to consider exceptions. That is an es­
sential first inquiry, if systemic discrimination is to be challenged.14
If accommodation issues arise, Meiorin says there is a duty to accommodate 
up to the point of undue hardship, but it does not follow that accommodation issues 
always arise. Once a prima facie case of discrimination (whether direct or adverse 
effect) has been made out, the duty to accommodate is theoretically engaged, but need
12 Meiorin, supra note 1, at para. 62.
13 Ibid. at paras. 39-42.
14 Dianne Pothier, “Tackling Disability Discrimination at Work: Toward a Systemic Approach” (Revised 
version of a paper presented at a conference on “The Charter and Human Rights at Work: 25 Years Later” 
held at the University o f Western Ontario, London, Ontario, 29 October 2007) at 17.
not be a practical issue.
Even where there is a potential issue of accommodation, the link to rea­
sonable necessity is important in focusing the accommodation inquiry. Accom­
modation involves exceptions or adjustments to rules. If a contemplated ex­
ception undermines the logic of the rule, it means the proper focus should be 
on the validity of the rule. This was ultimately the situation in Meiorin itself.
As described above, Meiorin involved an aerobic fitness test that was gender 
neutral on its face but, because of physiological differences, was disproportionately 
failed by women compared to men. Since this was a case of adverse effects discrimi­
nation, the previous jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada had said the issue 
was joined as an issue of the duty to accommodate by means of an exception, without 
any serious questioning of the standard itself. This exposed an inherent contradic­
tion in the context of Meiorin. To argue that an exception be made for Meiorin did 
undermine the rule. The justification for the aerobic fitness standard was safety. The 
union’s argument, accepted by the arbitrator, was that Meiorin’s past job performance 
proved that she could safely perform the job in spite of having failed the aerobic 
fitness test. In other words, the aerobic fitness standard was not an accurate test of 
safety. Thus the nub of the BFOR analysis in Meiorin is the validity—the reasonable 
necessity—of the rule which was found wanting by the Supreme Court of Canada.15
In order for accommodation to fit into a BFOR analysis, the concept of accom­
modation needs to be expanded beyond the O ’Malley notion of exceptions to rules that 
are accepted as generally valid. What Meiorin does, without fully explaining that it is 
changing the concept of accommodation, is expand the notion of accommodation—from 
exceptions to rules to adjustments to rules, potentially involving a challenge to the over­
all validity of the rule.16 That is an important implication of integrating the duty to ac­
commodate into the justification analysis demanded by a BFOR. Accommodation anal­
ysis is part of answering the question whether the standard is reasonably necessary.
The underlying question for a BFOR analysis is identifying the es­
sential qualifications for the job. If, with accommodation short of undue hard­
ship, the core functions of the job can be performed, a standard that excludes 
that accommodation will not be reasonably necessary and therefore will not be 
a BFOR. The accommodation may be an exception that leaves the rule generally 
intact, or an adjustment that significantly alters the rule. If the rule is wholly in­
valid it may be struck in its entirety without recourse to accommodation analy­
sis. Conversely, if no amount of accommodation will enable the essence of the 
job to be performed, the BFOR test of reasonable necessity will be established.
Where the necessity of the standard is obvious, the accommoda­
is  Meiorin. supra note 1, at paras. 72, 83.
16 Ibid. at paras. 64-65, 68.
tion analysis may be quite perfunctory. For example, in order to be a bus driver, 
it is necessary to be able to see well enough to drive. With current technol­
ogy, there is no accommodation that will enable a blind person to be a bus 
driver. But what the duty to accommodate demands is that, even with a seem­
ingly valid rule, the option of accommodation needs to be assessed. It involves 
probing deeply into the question of what is a reasonably necessary qualification.
This should all be very basic. But somehow the duty to accommodate since 
Meiorin has often not acknowledged the connection between the duty to accom­
modate and the justification element of the BFOR. That can happen when the duty 
to accommodate is inappropriately seen as a stand-alone concept, rather than, as it 
should be, understood as subsumed within the justification test of reasonable necessity.
In its most recent BFOR cases, McGill Health and Hydro-Quebec, the Su­
preme Court of Canada repeated the reasonably necessary description of the third 
step of Meiorin. 17  However, it did not highlight the reasonable necessity element in 
its application to the facts of the cases, since the issues had been joined at the duty to 
accommodate up to undue hardship. Both cases involved instances of termination for 
non-culpable absenteeism where the employers were held to have accommodated up to 
the point of undue hardship before terminating long-absent employees. I would sug­
gest that the link between accommodation and reasonable necessity helps to explain the 
analysis of termination for innocent absenteeism where a disability precludes a return 
to work. It matches up with the comments of Justice Deschamps in Hydro-Quebec 
identifying the “employee’s duty to perform work in exchange for remuneration.”18
A recent arbitration decision, Maple Leaf and Karges, brings home the real 
issues.19 Karges, the grievor, had been terminated after a thirty-nine-month absence 
from work. The employer relied on the following collective agreement provision:
The seniority of no employee will be considered broken, all rights for­
feited and the employee will be terminated when he/she has been absent 
from work due to illness or injury for thirty (30) months and there is no 
medical evidence of their ability to return to the workplace.
The grievor was on long term disability and a Canada Pension Plan per­
manent disability pension had been approved. Her psychiatrist diagnosed her 
as “totally disabled from work for foreseeable future” with an “unknown” re-
17 McGill University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l ’Hôpital 
general de Montréal [2007] 1 S.C.R.161 at para. 13, (2007), 277 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [McGill Health]-, 
Hydro-Québec, Syndicat des employé-e-s de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d ’Hydro-Québec, 
section locale 2000 (SCFP-FTQ) 2008 SCC 43 at para. 11,294 D.L.R. (4th) 407 [Hydro-Quebec].
\% Hydro-Québec, ibid. at para. 15.
19 Maple Leaf Consumer Foods Inc. and Schneider Employees Association (Karges), (2007) 165 L.A.C. 
(4th) 432 (Ont.).
tum-to-work date.20 Some might wonder about the point of the grievance, 
since it was not seriously contested that the grievor was unavailable for work.
The union’s principal motivation seems to have been to enable the grievor to 
continue to receive employee benefits such as extended health care.21 It is understand­
able that this would be of interest to the union and the grievor, and that a union would try 
to negotiate continued employee benefits for those on long-term disability. However, as 
arbitrator Hinnegan said, absent such a collective agreement right, human rights legisla­
tion does not require indefinite continuation of employee status to achieve this result. 
Relying heavily on McGill Health, the arbitrator held that the employer had met its duty 
to accommodate in having provided a lengthy opportunity for the employee to be in a 
position to return to work. The point can be made more directly and more obviously. As 
a BFOR, it is reasonably necessary that an employee actually show up for work. That is 
the most basic of job requirements. Some level of absenteeism is consistent with contin­
ued job status, but at some point undue hardship is reached establishing a BFOR.
The McGill Health and Hydro-Quebec cases not only reaffirm the connection 
between reasonably necessary and the duty to accommodate, they also reiterate the im­
portance of associating the duty to accommodate with the defence of undue hardship.
UNDUE HARDSHIP
As noted above, from the start the duty to accommodate has been limited by the de­
fence of undue hardship, with particular emphasis on the “undue” part. Some level 
of hardship is assumed to be consistent with the collective responsibility to ensure 
discrimination-free workplaces and beyond.22 However, in the early cases where the 
respondent employer had done nothing at all to accommodate, the discussion of undue 
hardship was rather abstract. There could be no concrete claim that the duty to accom­
modate had reached its outer limits when the existence of the duty had not even been 
acknowledged. More recently, however, the defence of undue hardship has been more 
concrete, and has been successfully invoked in the last two Supreme Court of Canada 
cases just mentioned, McGill Health and Hydro-Quebec.
In both McGill Health and Hydro-Quebec the Supreme Court of Canada 
overturned the decisions of the Quebec Court of Appeal, both of which imposed very 
stringent assessments of the duty to accommodate. Hydro-Quebec turned, in large 
measure, on the meaning of the word “impossible” in the third step of the Meiorin 
test. What is meant by Meiorin’s reference to “impossible to accommodate individual 
employees”?23 The Quebec Court of Appeal had separated out “impossible to accom­
modate” from “undue hardship”. It concluded that the employer had failed the test of 
impossibility, and thus failed the BFOR, without having reached discussion of undue
20 Ibid. at 433.
21 Ibid. at 436.
22 Renaud, supra note 1, at para. 19.
23 Meiorin, supra note 1, at para. 54.
hardship. It is extraordinary that the Quebec Court of Appeal thought Meiorin could be 
read in this way. All Supreme Court of Canada discussions of the duty to accommodate 
before, during, and since Meiorin have linked the duty to accommodate with the defence 
of undue hardship. The sentence in the third step of Meiorin using the word “impossible” 
ends with “without imposing undue hardship on the employer.”24 Both grammatically 
and conceptually, “impossible” needs to be understood as intertwined with “undue hard­
ship.” The Supreme Court of Canada, speaking through Deschamps J, unequivocally 
affirmed that in Hydro-Quebec.
However, there is a problem of interpretation in the instant case that seems to 
arise from the use of the word “impossible”. But it is clear from the way the 
approach was explained by McLachlin J. [in Meiorin] that this word relates to 
undue hardship. ... What is really required is not proof that it is impossible to 
integrate an employee who does not meet a standard, but proof of undue hard­
ship, which can take as many forms as there are circumstances.25
This means that undue hardship must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
What implications does this have for the role of the duty to accom­
modate in a BFOR analysis? It means that, as a legal obligation, the duty to ac­
commodate is the same for all employers once a prima facie case of discrimi­
nation has been made out. Yet the practical implications of that duty will vary 
widely because the point of undue hardship will vary according to the particu­
lar circumstances. Size of operation, skill level and interchangeability of em­
ployees, nature, and target of product or service provided are obvious factors 
that will impact on when and where the point of undue hardship will be reached.
As discussed above, it is also helpful to link assessment of undue hard­
ship back into the notion of reasonable necessity, as the overarching stan­
dard of justification for a BFOR. If a qualification is truly necessary for the 
proper performance of the job, it is an undue hardship to waive that qualifica­
tion. At the same time, the concept of “hardship” can help ensure that the con­
cept of “necessity” not be watered down. If there is no undue hardship involved 
in adjusting the standard, the unadjusted standard cannot be reasonably necessary.
The concepts of reasonable necessity, duty to accommodate, and the de­
fence of undue hardship are all inextricably linked. None can be properly under­
stood in isolation. None is a stand-alone concept. They are substantially interrelated
24 Ibid.
25 McGill Health, supra note 17 at para. 12.
AD HOC VERSUS SYSTEMIC ACCOMMODATION
As noted above, the initial concept of the duty to accommodate as adopted in O ’Malley 
was exclusively an individualized one, invoked on an ad hoc basis. Meiorin gives signs 
of expanding that notion. One of Meiorin's, critiques of the old bifurcated approach 
was that it risked legitimizing systemic discrimination by not challenging dominant 
norms.26 That suggests that systemic accommodation is needed to dismantle those norms. 
Meiorin also emphasizes the significance of contemplating and investigating alternate 
standards and of building accommodation into the standard.27 These stipulations reflect 
a more macro perspective on accommodation. They potentially involve fundamental 
transformation rather than just after-the-fact tinkering as contemplated in O ’Malley.28
Although O ’Malley was a case of creed discrimination and Meiorin was a case 
of sex discrimination, the concept of the duty to accommodate is especially significant in 
disability cases. The duty to accommodate is about dealing with difference, and disabil­
ity as a ground of discrimination encompasses the widest range of difference. Whether 
one approaches difference on an ad hoc or systemic basis will affect the breadth of im­
pact of accommodation.
I have previously contrasted ad hoc and systemic accommodation in the context 
of disability with reference to the earlier noted example of a standing rule that was in no 
sense reasonably necessary and thus not a BFOR.
Consider a revised version of the previous example. Assume the reason 
for the standing rule is that the job involves operating equipment that is 
designed to be used while standing. Thus the rule makes some sense in 
general, but not in a way that can be conclusive overall. The accommoda­
tion question is whether the equipment can be modified or adjusted so as 
to be operated from a seated position. It may matter a lot when one asks 
that question. If accommodation is merely ad hoc and individualized, that 
question can be asked after the fact, at which point the equipment modifica­
tion may be very difficult, potentially invoking undue hardship. In contrast, 
a systemic approach to accommodation would ask the question before the 
fact, and build into the initial design of the equipment a relatively easy 
means of adjusting from a standing to a seated position. Similarly, the ease 
of generating alternate format versions of printed documents (such as large 
print or Braille, or compatibility with a voice synthesizer) depends on the 
way in which the document was first created ... Thus a systemic approach 
to accommodation anticipates the need for individualized accommoda­
tion, and builds in the necessary flexibility from the outset. ...
A systemic approach to accommodation challenges able-bodied norms 
by contemplating diversity from the start. Ad hoc individualized accom­
modation contemplates “disability specific needs as a segregated thought
26 Meiorin, supra note 1 at paras. 39-42.
27 Ibid. at para. 65; ibid. at para. 68.
28 Colleen Sheppard, “Of Forest Fires and Systemic Discrimination: A Review of British Columbia 
(Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU” (2001) 46:2 McGill L J. 533-559.
rather than an inclusive thought”. In contrast, systemic accommodation is 
founded on “inclusive thought.” That is what gives the duty to accommo­
date the potential to be genuinely transformative in challenging able-bodied 
norms, instead of just after-the-fact tinkering. Although this distinction 
is not inconsistent with Meiorin, it is not clearly drawn out in the judg­
ment.29
Harris Rebar and Rose, a recent arbitration decision, is helpful in flesh­
ing out the interrelationship between ad hoc and systemic accommodation.30 Har­
ris Rebar dismissed Rose, relying on the following collective agreement provision:
16 The continuous service and a seniority status of an employee shall 
not be affected or interrupted as a result of layoffs, injury, illness, leaves 
of absence, or other cause and not due to the voluntary act or fault of the 
employee; however, the continuous service of an employee and his senior­
ity status shall be terminated for any of the following reasons, unless the 
Company and the, by agreement in writing, determine otherwise:
1. absence of an employee from work for three (3) consecutive 
regular working days without having requested permission to 
be absent or without notifying the Company, during such three 
(3) days, of the necessity of being absent, unless failure to re­
quest permission to be absent, or so notify the Company was 
due to circumstances beyond such employee’s control.
Rose’s absence was due to his having been on a drinking binge. Learning of that ex­
planation did not cause the employer to reconsider its decision to terminate, and the 
union grieved.
The loss of his job seems to have been a wake-up call for Rose, causing 
him to admit that he had a drinking problem, and ultimately to admit that he was 
an alcoholic. He used the services Harris Rebar had contracted for as its Em­
ployee Assistance Plan. There does not seem to have been any issue about his eli­
gibility for these services in spite of Rose’s termination, but it is not clear whether 
there was express coverage of terminated employees. By the time of the arbitra­
tion hearing Rose had completed an intensive treatment program and was receiv­
ing follow-up care, and had been successful “so far” in maintaining his sobriety.31
Arbitrator MacDowell concluded that alcoholism was the explanation both 
for Rose’s absence and his failure to call in, precluding the employer from reliance on
29 Supra note 14 at 18-19; notes omitted.
30 International Assn. o f Bridge Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, Local 834 v. Harris Rebar, a 
Division o f Harris Steel Ltd. (Shopmen’s Union) (Rose Grievance) (2007), 165 L.A.C. (4th) 1 [Harris 
Rebar and Rose].
31 Ibid. at 15.
article 16.
For the foregoing reasons, I find that to the grievor’s termination of 
employment, based on Article 16, cannot stand; nor was there “just 
cause” to terminate the grievor’s employment. In my opinion, the 
“no call no show” issue should, instead, have been dealt with as an in­
dividualized question of “disability” and “accommodation”. The 
grievor’s employment should not have been terminated.
I therefore direct that the grievor be reinstated in employment forth­
with, that his service and seniority be restored, and that he be compen­
sated for all wages and benefits lost from the date of his discharge, to 
the date of this Award - except for the period when he was seeking re­
habilitation for his alcoholism, and therefore would not reasonably 
have been permitted or able to work, (emphasis in original)32
As noted, arbitrator MacDowell emphasized the individual na­
ture of the accommodation, responding to Rose’s particular circumstanc­
es. He relied on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in McGill Health 
as authority for the requirement of individualized accommodation.33
McGill Health is proper authority for the importance of individualized 
accommodation, which explains why an automatic termination clause in a col­
lective agreement is not a conclusive answer from the employer.34 Given the in­
ability to contract out of human rights legislation, if a collective agreement offers 
less protection than human rights legislation would demand, it is ineffective.35
But McGill Health says more than that. It treats the three year automatic ter­
mination clause as “negotiated accommodation”.36 That description does not make it 
automatically valid, but it is relevant evidence as to what the parties considered as undue 
hardship.37 I have previously commented on this aspect of McGill Health as follows:
Although she does not precisely describe it in such terms, Justice Deschamps’ 
approach should, in my assessment, be commended as a move toward a sys­
temic assessment of undue hardship. Rather than an ad hoc process that treats 
every case as an isolated instance, it is preferable to think generally about 
what kind of long-term absenteeism would constitute undue hardship. Em­
ployers and unions are thus encouraged to negotiate automatic termination 
clauses, and encouraged to negotiate generous ones so as not to be generally 
vulnerable to challenge as inconsistent with human rights legislation. Any
32 Ibid. at 23.
33 Ibid. at 26.
34 Hydro-Quebec, supra note 17 at para. 22.
35 Ibid. at paras. 21-21.
36 Ibid. at para. 18.
37 Ibid. at para. 27.
case within the termination clause is automatically resolved. Any case out­
side the termination clause could possibly give rise to a challenge, but there 
will be a heavy evidentiary burden to succeed in such a challenge
... Waiting for a problem to emerge before contemplating how to deal with 
it is potentially dangerous. Confronting the issue in an ad hoc manner 
only when a particular case arises risks making mistakes when in a cri- 
sis-management mode. Assessing undue hardship in an anticipatory way, 
outside a particular context that may arise in a very charged atmosphere, 
is generally preferable. It can take the pressure off individual disabled em­
ployees who may already be quite vulnerable. Approaching accommoda­
tion up to the point of undue hardship in a general/systemic way, while 
still taking individual circumstances into consideration, will (overall at 
least) be less marginalizing to individual disabled employees.38
How, if at all, is systemic accommodation relevant to Harris Rebar and 
Rose? Although arbitrator MacDowell makes no comment on this point, systemic 
accommodation is actually the key to Rose’s reinstatement. Although the employer 
was unwilling to individually accommodate Rose in his job, it managed (perhaps in 
spite of itself) to offer systemic accommodation by having an Employee Assistance 
Plan available. The employer’s purchase of external services to constitute an Em­
ployee Assistance Plan was an example, inter alia, of anticipating the need to man­
age alcoholism, but without knowing which individuals could or would benefit from 
such services. This is individualized accommodation, but not ad hoc accommoda­
tion. It is properly described as systemic accommodation because it anticipates the 
general need for accommodation before the specific case arises. In the absence of 
the Employee Assistance Program, Rose might have had great difficulty in finding 
or affording a means of coming to terms with his alcoholism, enabling a return to 
work with a reasonable expectation of regular attendance. The success of systemic 
accommodation in this case precluded the employer from establishing undue hardship.
Although there are examples of systemic accommodation, the jurispru­
dence has yet to fully embrace the concept of systemic accommodation. If fully 
embraced, systemic accommodation has the potential to fundamentally transform 
the workplace. What started as minor tinkering in O ’Malley could become pro­
found change. Coming to terms with systemic accommodation is, in my assessment, 
the major current challenge to employers arising from human rights obligations.
CONCLUSION
The duty to accommodate is an evolving and expanding concept that needs to be un­
derstood in conjunction with related concepts. The duty to accommodate is part of 
the test for a BFOR, and thus is properly understood within a process of justifica­
tion, the most critical element of which is reasonable necessity. From the outset,
38 Supra note 14, at 26-27.
the duty to accommodate has been qualified by the defence of undue hardship. It is 
in the context of undue hardship that the specific circumstances of an employer will 
determine the ultimate scope of the duty to accommodate. Although the duty to ac­
commodate started out as individualized exceptions to rules while not challenging 
the general validity of rules, it has developed into a means of challenging norms. 
The duty to accommodate needs to take account of individual circumstances, but that 
can and should be done in a manner that includes a systemic approach to accom­
modation. To date, that is the least developed aspect of the duty to accommodate.
The BFOR notion of reasonable necessity, the duty to accommodate, the de­
fence of undue hardship, and the notion of systemic accommodation are all interre­
lated concepts that inform each other. None can properly be understood in isolation. 
All have had and will continue to have a profound impact on the organization of the 
world of work.
